Each member
of the
small groups should briefly
indicate what they found most striking in the reading; the group as a whole
should ultimately formulate a question for full seminar.
Q1. Patricia
Churchland illustrates the concept of
reduction by discussing how “temperature
was reduced to mean molecular
kinetic energy”(p 21.) Discuss how
she sees this reduction functioning in the history of science as it attempted
to explain thermal phenomena. In what
ways does this case illustrate, the
picture of reduction captured in figure 1.10.
How does she contrast her view of reduction of mind to brain with that
of functionalists in the philosophy of
mind (p. 25ff)? Do you find her initial embrace of reduction in this domain
plausible? If not, what problems do you
see? Has see addressed them in her
discussion of “general worries” (p. 28-29)
Q2. What is
Churchland’s view of metaphysics and
its relationship to science? How does it relate to the positions she attributes
to Charles Sanders Peirce and W.V. Quine?
How does she contrast her position with that she dubs “beyond science
metaphysics.” (p 41) What do you make of her argument that beyond science
metaphysics faces “tough questions” from evolutionary theory?
Q3. Churchland challenges
“substance dualism” from the perspective of neuroscience. (44 ff). Assess how she uses split-brain phenomena
and Alzheimer’s disease to advance this criticism.
Q4. Discuss Churchland’s
presentation of issues in the
metaphysics of causation. What is her
semi-Kantian strategy? (p. 57). Do you think that it suggests a viable way of
handling a traditional “beyond-science” metaphysical issues in an
(evolutionary) scientific way
Q5 Churchland introduces David Hume’s approach to the self and the
“conundrum” it faces (pp. 59-61)?
How does her discussion of “Grush
emulators” as representing self as agent (p 77ff), somatosensory systems
(p. 91ff), as representing our bodily self, mirror neurons (101) as representing ourselves among others, and
metarepresentation (p. 107) provide a “scientific approach” to the
philosophical (beyond science) to mind?
Q6. Churchland criticizes
Descartes notion that we have direct knowledge of our own mind and that this makes
knowledge of our mind different from knowledge of the physical world.(p.
118ff). She again appeal to elements of neuroscience in order to undermine the
notion that we he have noninferential and infallible knowledge of our own mind.
In doing so, uses science to undermine dualism (p. 123). Do you believe that she has been successful
in making her case. If so, why? If not, why not?
Q7. Churchland proposes an approach to human
consciousness that begins with “prototypes,” not for definition in terms of
necessary and sufficient conditions p. 129ff.
What contrast does she invoke? Do you find her examples, (e.g. old fire
and new fire, gravity/levity in terms of natural place as opposed to a
Newtonian conception) persuasive? Do
you think her approach would work for consciousness?
Q8. Churchland proposes two strategies for approaching consciousness scientifically: the direct vs the indirect. How does she see binocular rivalry contributing to the direct approach to sensory awareness and ultimately to consciousness? What problems or limitation does she see with the NCC (neural correlates of consciousness approach)? How does the analogy of electromagnetic radiation fit into this discussion ( p. 155)?
Q9. Churchland examines views of Baars and
Damasio as part of her exposition of the indirect approach to a scientific
theory of consciousness. What strengths
and liabilities does she find in these views?
Q10. Churchland concludes the chapter on
consciousness with an examination of what she call “Nine Naysaying Arguments.
(p. 173 ff). She concentrates on the
“inverted spectrum” argument. What is
it? What is her criticism? How does it illustrate
the “scientific” as opposed to the “beyond science” approach to metaphysics and
the philosophy of consciousness?