Each member of
the small groups should briefly indicate what they found most striking in the
reading; the group as a whole should ultimately formulate a question for full
seminar.
Q1
What does Wegner mean by conscious will? How is the experience of conscious will different from the
causation of action by a person’s conscious mind? Consider how Wegner displays this difference in his examples in
Chapter 1 as summarized in Figure 1.3 (p. 8).
Q2 Wegner says that he has gotten close
to “a basic principle about the illusion of conscious will (p. 26). His exposition describes two lenses—mechanical
causation and mental causation. Discuss the relationship between “mentalist”
and “mechanical” explanation of action according to Wegner (p. 21). How does
this lead to his claim to have “exposed” the illusion of conscious will? How
does it lead to his claim that Clarke’s insight that “any sufficiently advanced
technology is indistinguishable from magic” applies to “self perception” (p.
27).
Q3 Wegner displays
some early work on brain potential in Figure 2.7 (p. 51). Mark the location of the beginning of the
readiness potential (RP) on each the first three curves. Do the same for the peak. Finally, mark the blip
on the left (L) curve corresponding to the movement potential. Wegner then describes the experiments of
Libet and colleagues. How did they get
the results represented in Figure 2.8?
In particular how did they get the W series, the M series, and the S
series? How do they use them? Wegner
indicates that this research suggests that “the experience of consciousness
kicks in at some point after the brain has already started preparing for
the action (p. 54). What are some implications of this result according to
Wegner? How does it lead Wegner to
conclude that “consciousness is a kind of slug (p. 58)? What if any problems do you see in accepting
Wegner’s conclusions about the Libet experiment and other research reported in
chapter 2?
Q4 What is Wegner’s theory of apparent
mental causation (p. 65 ff)? How does
it relate to the “priority principle,” the “consistency principle,” and the
“exclusivity principle”? Consider the I
Spy experiment results presented in Figure 3.4 (p. 77) in support of the
priority principle. Discuss the examples of social co-action—have you had any
of the experiences he cites (p. 94)?
How does social co-action cases support the exclusivity principle
according to Wegner?
Q5
How does the theory of apparent mental causation fit in with Wegner’s
assumptions about the “experience of will”?
(p. 95) Draw a diagram showing
the relationship of the experience of conscious will, apparent mental causation,
and the “mechanistic process of real mental causation” according to Wegner’s
account? (p. 96)
Q6 Discuss your favorite example of
automatism (as presented in chapter four) as well as a case of “ideomotor
action” (p. 120 f). According to Wegner,
in what ways do these cases represent a breach of the principles of priority (p.
134 bottom) , consistency (135f), or exclusivity (142 bottom) that he sees as
essential for the experience of conscious will?
Q7 What leads Wegner to speculate that
“automaticism is the rule, and the illusion of conscious will is the exception”
(p. 143) or “automaticisms” might be
the rule and conscious behavior the odd case? (p. 144)
Q8. What role does the ideal agent (p.
146) play in Wegner’s explanation of confabulation of intention? How does this help support his notions about
the illusion of conscious will? After
reading about various experiments related to cognitive dissonance and
self-perception theory, as well as the left brain interpreter cases (pp.
172-184), what conclusion do you reach regarding our knowledge of our own
intentions in action?
.