Q1 Patricia Churchland,
following her method of neurophilosophy that “naturalizes” traditional
philosophical issues, addresses free choice (pp. 203-8). What are her
objections to some of these traditional views? Do you buy her argument?
Q2 Churchland’s
positive position treats responsibility in terms of prototype conditions. What does she mean by a prototype? How is it
similar to “precedent law” (p. 211).
How, if at all, does this approach change the nature of the
philosophical debate over free choice and responsibility?
Q3 Churchland presents
an emerging account of the neurobiology of decision making. She then asks how well the “noncausal choice
hypothesis” meshes with what is known at present about neurons and the nervous
system (p. 233). In particular, she considers whether appeal to quantum
mechanics provides a plausible hypothesis with promising prospects? What are her arguments against such a
research program? What is her overall
conclusion with regard to the noncausal choice hypothesis?
Q4 In the last section of the Free Will
chapter she addresses the “dominate background question motivating” it: namely,
is anyone ever really responsible for his actions? (p. 234). Describe and
assess her position.
Q5 Searle’s discussion of free will includes both the experiences of human freedom and the gap between awareness of the reasons for the action and the decision to perform the action (p. 152), which he says is the “basis of our conviction that we have free will” (p. 153). Is his notion of this gap the same as Wegner’s notion of the experience of conscious will? When Searle says (p. 153) “the experience of free will is not something that we can readily dismiss as mere illusion” is he challenging Wegner or does he mean something different by “mere illusion” than what Wegner means in the “illusion of conscious will.” Consider his explicit reference to Wegner (p. 158, footnote 1 at top of page)?
Q6 Searle distinguishes a
logical point about compatibilism from a “factual, empirical question” (p.
155). What is this distinction? This leads him to examine both psychological and neurobiological determinism. What are his conclusions? Assess his argument in favor of
psychological freedom and his comments about the two hypothesis concerning
neurobiological determinism. In particular, consider his claim that hypothesis
1, which he finds the most plausible, seems to be incompatible with evolution
(p. 161).
Q7 In his discussion of the self in chapter 11, Searle returns to a
discussion of freedom. He says (p. 202)
that we need to “postulate a rational self or agent that is capable of acting
freely and capable of assuming responsibility for action.” He says (p. 204) that such a notion of the
self is “formal” rather than “substantive.” How, if at all, does this notion of
“self” differ from Wegner’s ideas about virtual agents? Does Searle’s (brief) comments about how such a self is
“formal” save him from a Cartesian type of dualism that postulates a mind substance
(a “substantive” self)?
Q8 Churchland considers three paths or grounds
for believing in a (standard) Diety? The first path looks at evidence and
analysis that has been offered to establish the existence of a Diety, including
the argument from design, the argument from first cause, and the argument from
evil. What objections does she raise to each of these arguments? Do you find her criticism compelling? If so, why? If not, why not?
Q10 Churchland’s discussion of the third path, faith, includes
reference to Paul Davies’ claim that science as well as religion is based on
faith (p. 392). What is her objections
to this position? Does she make a
compelling case?
Q11. Churchland’s brief
exploration of the relationship of religion and morality focuses on the
argument in Plato’s Euthyphro. What is this argument? How does Churchland use it to bolster her
interest in providing a “naturalized perspective on the foundation of moral
judgment”? (p. 400)