

Mind and the World
Kant's Transcendental Deduction
February 5, 2007

§13 "on the principles of a t.d. in general"

"quid juris" – what's the legal ground for entitlement to the use of the pure concepts of the understanding?

A "transcendental deduction" will show "the way in which concepts can relate to objects *a priori*" (A85/B117)

Experience may give use "the occasional cause of their generation," but this will not establish their *a priori* entitlement

We can be assured that the concepts of space and time, while *a priori*, must relate to the objects of experience because they are the forms of the only kind of intuition humans possess. Appearances cannot be given to the understanding without being appearances in space and time. The concepts of the understanding, e.g. cause, differ critically since appearances can be given without these functions being brought into play. So the difficult question arises: how can we have an *a priori* justification that establishes the use of these concepts for *all possible objects of experience*, i.e. how can we be assured of their necessity as functions of the understanding?

We find ourselves presented with objects of sensible intuition, which *obviously* must accord with the forms of sensibility (space and time). But why must these objects accord with the pure concepts of the understanding? This is a question that must be answered, "For appearances could after all be so constituted that the understanding would not find them in accord with the conditions of its unity, and everything would lie in... confusion..."

"Transition to the t.d. of the categories" (A92/B125)

We are presented with the (synthetic) representation of objects:
Intuition: as appearances, these must occur in space and time
Thought (cognition): it is through **concept** that an **object** (as opposed to an appearance) is represented.

And it *only* through the pure concepts of the understanding that **objects** can be represented.

§ 15 "On the possibility of a combination in general"

Now "...all combination, whether we are conscious of it or not, whether it is a combination of the manifold of intuition or of several concepts, and in the first case either of sensible or non-sensible intuition, is an action of the understanding..." and this is all *synthesis*.
B130

This *unity* is presupposed by all categories, by all combination, "We must therefore seek this unity ...someplace higher, namely in that which itself contains the ground of the unity of different concepts in judgments, and hence of the possibility of the understanding, even in its logical use."

§ 16 "On the original-synthetic unity of apperception"

The manifold given in a representation must belong of my self-consciousness, "... They must not necessarily be in accord with the conditions under which alone they **can** stand together in a universal self-consciousness, because otherwise they would not throughout belong to me." (B133)

B135 Kant offers "the supreme [principle]... in the whole of human cognition" – "Combination does not lie in the objects... and cannot...be borrowed from them through perception and by that means first taken up into the understanding, but is rather only an operation of the understanding, which is itself nothing further than the faculty of combining *a priori* and bringing the manifold of given representations under unity of apperception..."

§17 "The principle of the synthetic unity of apperception is the supreme principle of all use of the understanding"

"The supreme principle of the possibility of all intuition in relation to sensibility was...that all the manifold of sensibility stand under the formal conditions of space and time."

"The supreme principle of all intuition in relation to the understanding is that all the manifold of intuition stand under conditions of the original synthetic unity of apperception." (B136)

In sensibility, all that we are **given** falls into (one) space and (one) time. If not, they couldn't be combined.

In understanding, the manifold is combined into an **object**, "united." "Now, however, all unification of representations requires unity of consciousness in the synthesis of them. Consequently the unity of consciousness is that which alone constitutes the relation of representations of an object, thus their objective validity; and consequently is that which makes them into cognitions and on which even the possibility of the understanding rests." (B137)

Sensible intuitions are given **in space** but they are not thereby **objects**. To be **objects**, it is not enough that the intuitions are *mine* – rather I must "bring about a determinate combination of a given manifold, so that the unity of this action is at the same time the unity of consciousness (in the concept of a line), and thereby is an object (a determinate space) first cognized." (B138)

Because we do not *intuit* except sensibly, and what we intuit are representations that might or might not fall under concepts, they come to fall under concepts because we put them there, because we "draw" them into a conceptualized world of objects.

§18 "What objective unity of self-consciousness is"

The manifold given in an intuition is united in a concept of the object, and that unity through which this is done is the "transcendental unity of apperception." I have to bring to the manifold concepts of the understanding in order to represent objects: this unity stems from the understanding and its unity, not from supposed unity in the given intuitions.

§19 The logical form of all judgments consists in the objective unity of the apperception of the concepts contained therein.

In judgment, what is the relationship between the Subject and the Predicate? They are combined *in an object*. Compare this to Locke or Hume's "way" with judgments. Two ideas are combined, but how are they *joined*? A+B fails to become an **object**, it's simply a more complex **quality**.

§20 “All sensible intuitions stand under the categories, as conditions under which alone their manifold can come together in one consciousness.”

§21 “Remark”

What are the categories? “They are only rules for an understanding whose entire capacity consists in thinking, i.e., in the action of bringing the synthesis of the manifold that is given to it in intuition from elsewhere to the unity of apperception, which therefore **cognizes** nothing at all by itself, but only combines and orders the material for cognition, the intuition, which must be given to it through the object.”

But why is it this way? “ But for the peculiarity of our understanding, that it is able to bring about the unity of apperception *a priori* only by means of the categories and only through precisely this kind and number of them, a further ground may be offered just as little as one can be offered for why we have precisely these and not other functions of judgment or for why space and time are the sole forms of our possible intuition.” (B146)