Against Theory

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By "theory" we mean a special project in literary criticism: the attempt to govern interpretations of particular texts by appealing to an account of interpretation in general. The term is sometimes applied to literary subjects with no direct bearing on the interpretation of individual works, such as narratology, stylistics, and prosody. Despite their generality, however, these subjects seem to us essentially empirical, and our argument against theory will not apply to them.

Contemporary theory has taken two forms. Some theorists have sought to ground the reading of literary texts in methods designed to guarantee the objectivity and validity of interpretations. Others, impressed by the inability of such procedures to produce agreement among interpreters, have translated that failure into an alternative mode of theory that denies the possibility of correct interpretation. Our aim here is not to choose between these two alternatives but rather to show that both rest on a single mistake, a mistake that is central to the notion of theory per se. The object of our critique is not a particular way of doing theory but the idea of doing theory at all.

Theory attempts to solve—or to celebrate the impossibility of solving—a set of familiar problems: the function of authorial intention, the status of literary language, the role of interpretive assumptions, and so on. We will not attempt to solve these problems, nor will we be con-
cerned with tracing their history or surveying the range of arguments they have stimulated. In our view, the mistake on which all critical theory rests has been to imagine that these problems are real. In fact, we will claim such problems only seem real—and theory itself only seems possible or relevant—when theorists fail to recognize the fundamental inseparability of the elements involved.

The clearest example of the tendency to generate theoretical problems by splitting apart terms that are in fact inseparable is the persistent debate over the relation between authorial intention and the meaning of texts. Some theorists have claimed that valid interpretations can only be obtained through an appeal to authorial intentions. This assumption is shared by theorists who, denying the possibility of recovering authorial intentions, also deny the possibility of valid interpretations. But once it is seen that the meaning of a text is simply identical to the author's intended meaning, the project of grounding meaning in intention becomes incoherent. Since the project itself is incoherent, it can neither succeed nor fail; hence both theoretical attitudes toward intention are irrelevant. The mistake made by theorists has been to imagine the possibility or desirability of moving from one term (the author's intended meaning) to a second term (the text's meaning), when actually the two terms are the same. One can neither succeed nor fail in deriving one term from the other, since to have one is already to have them both.

In the following two sections we will try to show in detail how theoretical accounts of intention always go wrong. In the fourth section we will undertake a similar analysis of an influential account of the role interpretive assumptions or beliefs play in the practice of literary criticism. The issues of belief and intention are, we think, central to the theoretical enterprise; our discussion of them is thus directed not only against specific theoretical arguments but against theory in general. Our examples are meant to represent the central mechanism of all theoretical arguments, and our treatment of them is meant to indicate that all such arguments will fail and fail in the same way. If we are right, then the whole enterprise of critical theory is misguided and should be abandoned.

2. Meaning and Intention

The fact that what a text means is what its author intends is clearly stated by E. D. Hirsch when he writes that the meaning of a text “is, and can be, nothing other than the author’s meaning” and “is determined once and for all by the character of the speaker’s intention.” Having defined meaning as the author’s intended meaning, Hirsch goes on to argue that all literary interpretation “must stress a reconstruction of the author’s aims and attitudes in order to evolve guides and norms for construing the meaning of his text.” Although these guides and norms cannot guarantee the correctness of any particular reading—nothing can—they nevertheless constitute, he claims, a “fundamentally sound” and “objective” method of interpretation (pp. 224, 240).

What seems odd about Hirsch’s formulation is the transition from definition to method. He begins by defining textual meaning as the author’s intended meaning and then suggests that the best way to find textual meaning is to look for authorial intention. But if meaning and intended meaning are already the same, it’s hard to see how looking for one provides an objective method—or any sort of method—for looking for the other; looking for one just is looking for the other. The recognition that what a text means and what its author intends it to mean are identical should entail the further recognition that any appeal from one to the other is useless. And yet, as we have already begun to see, Hirsch thinks the opposite; he believes that identifying meaning with the expression of intention has the supreme theoretical usefulness of providing an objective method of choosing among alternative interpretations.

Hirsch, however, has failed to understand the force of his own formulation. In one moment he identifies meaning and intended meaning; in the next moment he splits them apart. This mistake is clearly visible in his polemic against formalist critics who deny the importance of intention altogether. His argument against these critics ends up invoking their account of meaning at the expense of his own. Formalists, in Hirsch’s summary, conceive the text as a “‘piece of language,’” a “public object whose character is defined by public norms.” The problem with this account, according to Hirsch, is that “no mere sequence of words can represent an actual verbal meaning with reference to public norms alone. Referred to these alone, the text’s meaning remains indeterminate.” Hirsch’s example, “My car ran out of gas,” is, as he notes, susceptible to an indeterminate range of interpretations. There

1. E. D. Hirsch, Jr., *Validity in Interpretation* (New Haven, Conn., 1967), pp. 216, 219. Our remarks on Hirsch are in some ways parallel to criticisms offered by P. D. Juhl in the second chapter of his *Interpretation: An Essay in the Philosophy of Literary Criticism* (Princeton, N.J., 1980). Juhl’s position will be discussed in the next section. All further citations to these works will be included in the text.
are no public norms which will help us decide whether the sentence means that my automobile lacks fuel or “my Pullman dash[ed] from a cloud of Argon.” Only by assigning a particular intention to the words “My car ran out of gas” does one arrive at a determinate interpretation. Or, as Hirsch himself puts it, “The array of possibilities only begins to become a more selective system of probabilities when, instead of confronting merely a word sequence, we also posit a speaker who very likely means something” (p. 225).  

This argument seems consistent with Hirsch’s equation of meaning and intended meaning, until one realizes that Hirsch is imagining a moment of interpretation before intention is present. This is the moment at which the text’s meaning “remains indeterminate,” before such indeterminacy is cleared up by the addition of authorial intention. But if meaning and intention really are inseparable, then it makes no sense to think of intention as an ingredient that needs to be added; it must be present from the start. The issue of determinacy or indeterminacy is irrelevant. Hirsch thinks it’s relevant because he thinks, correctly, that the movement from indeterminacy to determinacy involves the addition of information, but he also thinks, incorrectly, that adding information amounts to adding intention. Since intention is already present, the only thing added, in the movement from indeterminacy to determinacy, is information about the intention, not the intention itself. For a sentence like “My car ran out of gas” even to be recognizable as a sentence, we must already have posited a speaker and hence an intention. Pinning down an interpretation of the sentence will not involve adding a speaker but deciding among a range of possible speakers. Knowing that the speaker inhabits a planet with an atmosphere of inert gases and on which the primary means of transportation is railroad will give one interpretation; knowing that the speaker is an earthling who owns a Ford will give another. But even if we have none of this information, as soon as we attempt to interpret at all we are already committed to a characterization of the speaker as a speaker of language. We know, in other words, that the speaker intends to speak; otherwise we wouldn’t be interpreting. In this latter case, we have less information about the speaker than in the other two (where we at least knew the speaker’s planetary origin), but the relative lack of information has nothing to do with the presence or absence of intention.

This mistake no doubt accounts for Hirsch’s peculiar habit of calling the proper object of interpretation the “author’s meaning” and, in later writings, distinguishing between it and the “reader’s meaning.” The choice between these two kinds of meaning becomes, for Hirsch, an ethical imperative as well as an “operational” necessity. But if all mean-

ing is always the author’s meaning, then the alternative is an empty one, and there is no choice, ethical or operational, to be made. Since theory is designed to help us make such choices, all theoretical arguments on the issue of authorial intention must at some point accept the premises of anti-intentionalist accounts of meaning. In debates about intention, the moment of imagining intentionless meaning constitutes the theoretical moment itself. From the standpoint of an argument against critical theory, then, the only important question about intention is whether there can in fact be intentionless meanings. If our argument against theory is to succeed, the answer to this question must be no.

The claim that all meanings are intentional is not, of course, an unfamiliar one in contemporary philosophy of language. John Searle, for example, asserts that “there is no getting away from intentionality,” and he and others have advanced arguments to support this claim. Our purpose here is not to add another such argument but to show how radically counterintuitive the alternative would be. We can begin to get a sense of this simply by noticing how difficult it is to imagine a case of intentionless meaning.

Suppose that you’re walking along a beach and you come upon a curious sequence of squiggles in the sand. You step back a few paces and notice that they spell out the following words:

A slumber did my spirit seal;
I had no human fears:
She seemed a thing that could not feel
The touch of earthly years.

This would seem to be a good case of intentionless meaning: you recognize the writing as writing, you understand what the words mean, you may even identify them as constituting a rhymed poetic stanza—and all this without knowing anything about the author and indeed without needing to connect the words to any notion of an author at all. You can do all these things without thinking of anyone’s intention. But now suppose that, as you stand gazing at this pattern in the sand, a wave washes up and recedes, leaving in its wake (written below what you now realize was only the first stanza) the following words:

No motion has she now, no force;
She neither hears nor sees;
Rolled round in earth’s diurnal course,
With rocks, and stones, and trees.

5. Wordsworth’s lyric has been a standard example in theoretical arguments since its adoption by Hirsch; see Validity in Interpretation, pp. 227–30 and 238–40.
One might ask whether the question of intention still seems as irrelevant as it did seconds before. You will now, we suspect, feel compelled to explain what you have just seen. Are these marks mere accidents, produced by the mechanical operation of the waves on the sand (through some subtle and unprecedented process of erosion, percolation, etc.)? Or is the sea alive and striving to express its pantheistic faith? Or has Wordsworth, since his death, become a sort of genius of the shore who inhabits the waves and periodically inscribes on the sand his elegiac sentiments? You might go on extending the list of explanations indefinitely, but you would find, we think, that all the explanations fall into two categories. You will either be ascribing these marks to some agent capable of intentions (the living sea, the haunting Wordsworth, etc.), or you will count them as nonintentional effects of mechanical processes (erosion, percolation, etc.). But in the second case—where the marks now seem to be accidents—will they still seem to be words?

Clearly not. They will merely seem to resemble words. You will be amazed, perhaps, that such an astonishing coincidence could occur. Of course, you would have been no less amazed had you decided that the sea or the ghost of Wordsworth was responsible. But it’s essential to recognize that in the two cases your amazement would have two entirely different sources. In one case, you would be amazed by the identity of the author—who would have thought that the sea can write poetry? In the other case, however, in which you accept the hypothesis of natural accident, you’re amazed to discover that what you thought was poetry turns out not to be poetry at all. It isn’t poetry because it isn’t language; that’s what it means to call it an accident. As long as you thought the marks were poetry, you were assuming their intentional character. You had no idea who the author was, and this may have tricked you into thinking that positing an author was irrelevant to your ability to read the stanza. But in fact you had, without realizing it, already posited an author. It was only with the mysterious arrival of the second stanza that your tacit assumption (e.g., someone writing with a stick) was challenged and you realized that you had made one. Only now, when positing an author seems impossible, do you genuinely imagine the marks as authorless. But to deprive them of an author is to convert them into accidental likenesses of language. They are not, after all, an example of intentionless meaning; as soon as they become intentionless they become meaningless as well.

The arrival of the second stanza made clear that what had seemed to be an example of intentionless language was either not intentionless or not language. The question was whether the marks counted as language; what determined the answer was a decision as to whether or not they were the product of an intentional agent. If our example has seemed farfetched, it is only because there is seldom occasion in our culture to
wonder whether the sea is an intentional agent. But there are cases where the question of intentional agency might be an important and difficult one. Can computers speak? Arguments over this question reproduce exactly the terms of our example. Since computers are machines, the issue of whether they can speak seems to hinge on the possibility of intentionless language. But our example shows that there is no such thing as intentionless language; the only real issue is whether computers are capable of intentions. However this issue may be decided—and our example offers no help in deciding it—the decision will not rest on a theory of meaning but on a judgment as to whether computers can be intentional agents. This is not to deny that a great deal—morally, legally, and politically—might depend on such judgments. But no degree of practical importance will give these judgments theoretical force.

The difference between theoretical principle and practical or empirical judgments can be clarified by one last glance at the case of the wave poem. Suppose, having seen the second stanza wash up on the beach, you have decided that the “poem” is really an accidental effect of erosion, percolation, and so on and therefore not language at all. What would it now take to change your mind? No theoretical argument will make a difference. But suppose you notice, rising out of the sea some distance from the shore, a small submarine, out of which clamber a half dozen figures in white lab coats. One of them trains his binoculars on the beach and shouts triumphantly, “It worked! It worked! Let’s go down and try it again.” Presumably, you will now once again change your mind, not because you have a new account of language, meaning, or intention but because you now have new evidence of an author. The question of authorship is and always was an empirical question; it has now received a new empirical answer. The theoretical temptation is to imagine that such empirical questions must, or should, have theoretical answers.

Even a philosopher as committed to the intentional status of language as Searle succumbs to this temptation to think that intention is a theoretical issue. After insisting, in the passage cited earlier, on the inescapability of intention, he goes on to say that “in serious literal speech the sentences are precisely the realizations of the intentions” and that “there need be no gulf at all between the illocutionary intention and its expression.” The point, however, is not that there need be no gulf between intention and the meaning of its expression but that there can be no gulf. Not only in serious literal speech but in all speech what is intended and what is meant are identical. In separating the two Searle imagines the possibility of expression without intention and so, like Hirsch, misses the point of his own claim that when it comes to language

“there is no getting away from intentionality.” Missing this point, and hence imagining the possibility of two different kinds of meaning, is more than a theoretical mistake; it is the sort of mistake that makes theory possible. It makes theory possible because it creates the illusion of a choice between alternative methods of interpreting.\(^7\)

To be a theorist is only to think that there is such a choice. In this respect intentionalists and anti-intentionalists are the same. They are also the same in another respect: neither can really escape intention. But this doesn’t mean the intentionalists win, since what intentionalists want is a guide to valid interpretation; what they get, however, is simply a description of what everyone always does. In practical terms, then, the stakes in the battle over intention are extremely low—in fact, they don’t exist. Hence it doesn’t matter who wins. In theoretical terms, however, the stakes are extremely high, and it still doesn’t matter who wins. The stakes are high because they amount to the existence of theory itself; it doesn’t matter who wins because as long as one thinks that a position on intention (either for or against) makes a difference in achieving valid interpretations, the ideal of theory itself is saved. Theory wins. But as soon as we recognize that there are no theoretical choices to be made, then the point of theory vanishes. Theory loses.\(^8\)

\(^7\) In conversation with the authors, Hirsch mentioned the case of a well-known critic and theorist who was persuaded by new evidence that his former reading of a poem was mistaken but who, nevertheless, professed to like his original reading better than what he now admitted was the author’s intention. Hirsch meant this example to show the importance of choosing intention over some other interpretive criterion. But the critic in Hirsch’s anecdote was not choosing among separate methods of interpretation; he was simply preferring his mistake. Such a preference is surely irrelevant to the theory of interpretation; it might affect what one does with an interpretation, but it has no effect on how one gets an interpretation.

\(^8\) The arguments presented here against theoretical treatments of intention at the local utterance level would apply, virtually unaltered, to accounts of larger-scale intentions elsewhere in Hirsch; they would apply as well to the theoretical proposals of such writers as M. H. Abrams, Wayne C. Booth, R. S. Crane, and Ralph W. Rader—all associated, directly or indirectly, with the Chicago School. Despite variations of approach and emphasis, these writers tend to agree that critical debates about the meaning of a particular passage ought to be resolved through reference to the broader structural intentions informing the work in which the passage appears. Local meanings, in this view, should be deduced from hypothetical constructions of intentions implicit, for example, in an author’s choice of genre; these interpretive hypotheses should in turn be confirmed or falsified by their success or failure in explaining the work’s details. But this procedure would have methodological force only if the large-scale intentions were different in theoretical status from the local meanings they are supposed to constrain. We would argue, however, that all local meanings are always intentional and that structural choices and local utterances are therefore related to intention in exactly the same fashion. While an interpreter’s sense of one might determine his sense of the other, neither is available to interpretation—or amenable to interpretive agreement—in a specially objective way. (Whether interpretations of intention at any level are best conceived as hypotheses is another, though a related, question.)
3. Language and Speech Acts

We have argued that what a text means and what its author intends it to mean are identical and that their identity robs intention of any theoretical interest. A similar account of the relation between meaning and intention has recently been advanced by P. D. Juhl. According to Juhl, “there is a logical connection between statements about the meaning of a literary work and statements about the author’s intention such that a statement about the meaning of a work is a statement about the author’s intention.” Juhl criticizes Hirsch, as we do, for believing that critics “ought to . . . try to ascertain the author’s intention,” when in fact, Juhl argues, “they are necessarily doing so already” (Interpretation, p. 12). But for Juhl, these claims serve in no way to discredit theory; rather, they themselves constitute a theory that “makes us aware of what we as critics or readers are doing in interpreting literature” and, more crucially, “provides the basis for a principled acceptance or rejection of an interpretation of a literary work” (p. 10). How is it that Juhl derives a theory from arguments which seem to us to make theory impossible?

What makes this question particularly intriguing is the fact that Juhl’s strategy for demonstrating the centrality of intention is apparently identical to ours; it consists “in contrasting statements about the meaning of a literary work created by a person with statements about the meaning of a text produced by chance, such as a computer poem” (p. 13).9 But Juhl’s treatment of examples like our wave poem reveals that his sense of the relation between language and intention is after all radically different from ours. Like Hirsch, but at a further level of abstraction, Juhl ends up imagining the possibility of language prior to and independent of intention and thus conceiving intention as something that must be added to language to make it work. Like Hirsch, and like theorists in general, Juhl thinks that intention is a matter of choice. But where Hirsch recommends that we choose intention to adjudicate among interpretations, Juhl thinks no recommendation is necessary—not because we need never choose intention but only because our concept of a literary work is such that to read literature is already to have chosen intention.

Discussing the case of a “poem” produced by chance (“marks on [a] rock” or “a computer poem”), Juhl points out that there is “something odd about interpreting [such a] ‘text.’” However one might understand this text, one could not understand it as a representation of “the meaning of a particular utterance.” We agree with this—if it implies that the

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9. In fact, Juhl employs the same poem we do—Wordsworth’s “A Slumber Did My Spirit Seal”—in his own treatment of accidental “language” (Interpretation, pp. 70–82). The device of contrasting intentional speech acts with marks produced by chance is a familiar one in speech-act theory.
random marks mean nothing, are not language, and therefore cannot be interpreted at all. But for Juhl the implications are different. He thinks that one can interpret the random marks, though only in the somewhat specialized sense “in which we might be said to ‘interpret’ a sentence when we explain its meaning to a foreigner, by explaining to him what the individual words mean, how they function in the sentence, and thus how the sentence could be used or what it could be used to express or convey” (pp. 84–86).

Our point is that marks produced by chance are not words at all but only resemble them. For Juhl, the marks remain words, but words detached from the intentions that would make them utterances. Thus he can argue that when a “parrot utters the words ‘Water is pouring down from the sky,’” one can understand that “the words mean ‘It is raining’” but deny that the “parrot said that it is raining” (p. 109). It is clear that, for Juhl, the words continue to mean even when devoid of intention. They mean “in abstracto” and thus constitute the condition of language prior to the addition of intention, that is, prior to “a speaker’s utterance or speech act.” In literary interpretation, this condition of language is never operative because, Juhl claims, “our notion of the meaning of a literary work” is “like our notion of the meaning of a person’s speech act,” not “like our notion of the meaning of a word in a language” (p. 41).

Implicit in Juhl’s whole treatment of meaning and intention is the distinction made here between language and speech acts. This distinction makes possible a methodological prescription as strong as Hirsch’s, if more general: when confronted with a piece of language, read it as a speech act. The prescriptive force of Juhl’s argument is obscured by the fact that he has pushed the moment of decision one step back. Whereas Hirsch thinks we have to add intention to literature in order to determine what a text means, Juhl thinks that adding intentions to language gives us speech acts (such as literary works) whose meaning is already determinate. Juhl recognizes that as soon as we think of a piece of language as literature, we already regard it as a speech act and hence the product of intention; his prescription tells us how to get from language in general to a specific utterance, such as a literary work.12

10. Juhl briefly acknowledges the strangeness of the sort of distinction he makes here when he asks whether words produced by chance could even be called “words” (Interpretation, p. 84). But he drops the question as abruptly as he raises it.

11. For additional remarks on meaning “in abstracto,” see Juhl, Interpretation, pp. 25 n, 55–57, 203, 223, 238, 288–89.

12. Juhl’s motives are, in fact, not far from Hirsch’s. For both theorists, meaning in abstracto is indeterminate or ambiguous (“indeterminate” for Hirsch, “ambiguous” for Juhl); both appeal to intention in order to achieve determinate or particular meanings or, as Juhl says, to “disambiguate” the text (Interpretation, p. 97). This theoretical interest in the problem of indeterminacy derives in part from the widespread notion that words and sentences have a range of “linguistically possible” meanings, the ones recorded in dic-
But this prescription only makes sense if its two terms (language and speech acts) are not already inseparable in the same way that meaning and intention are. Juhl is right of course to claim that marks without intention are not speech acts, since the essence of a speech act is its intentional character. But we have demonstrated that marks without intention are not language either. Only by failing to see that linguistic meaning is always identical to expressed intention can Juhl imagine language without speech acts. To recognize the identity of language and speech acts is to realize that Juhl's prescription—when confronted with language, read it as a speech act—can mean nothing more than: when confronted with language, read it as language.

For Hirsch and Juhl, the goal of theory is to provide an objectively valid method of literary interpretation. To make method possible, both are forced to imagine intentionless meanings or, in more general terms, to imagine a separation between language and speech acts. The method then consists in adding speech acts to language; speech acts bring with them the particular intentions that allow interpreters to clear up the ambiguities intrinsic to language as such. But this separation of language and speech acts need not be used to establish an interpretive method; it can in fact be used to do just the opposite. For a theorist like Paul de Man, the priority of language to speech acts suggests that all attempts to arrive at determinate meanings by adding intentions amount to a violation of the genuine condition of language. If theory in its positive or methodological mode rests on the choice of speech acts over language, theory in its negative or antimethodological mode tries to preserve what it takes to be the purity of language from the distortion of speech acts.

The negative theorist's hostility to method depends on a particular account of language, most powerfully articulated in de Man's "The Purloined Ribbon." The essay concerns what de Man sees as a crucial episode in Rousseau's Confessions, in which Rousseau attempts to interpret, and thereby to justify, a particularly incriminating speech act. While working as a servant, he had stolen a ribbon from his employers.

13. This distinction, in one form or another, is common among speech-act theorists. H. P. Grice, for example, distinguishes between "locutions of the form 'U (utterer) meant that . . . '" and "locutions of the form 'X (utterance-type) means . . . '," characterizing the first as "occasion-meaning" and the second as "applied timeless meaning" (H. P. Grice, "Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning," in The Philosophy of Language, ed. Searle [London, 1971], pp. 54–56). And Searle, citing Wittgenstein ("Say 'it's cold here' and mean 'it's warm here'"), distinguishes between meaning as a "matter of intention" and meaning as a "matter of convention" (Speech Acts [Cambridge, 1969], p. 45).
When accused of the theft, he blamed it on a fellow servant, Marion. In the passage that interests de Man, Rousseau is thus concerned with two crimes, the theft itself and the far more heinous act of excusing himself by accusing an innocent girl. This second act, the naming of Marion, is the one that especially needs justifying.

Rousseau offers several excuses, each an explanation of what he meant by naming Marion. But the explanation that intrigues de Man is the surprising one that Rousseau perhaps meant nothing at all when he said “Marion.” He was merely uttering the first sound that occurred to him: “Rousseau was making whatever noise happened to come into his head; he was saying nothing at all.” Hence, de Man argues, “In the spirit of the text, one should resist all temptation to give any significance whatever to the sound ‘Marion.’” The claim that “Marion” was meaningless gives Rousseau his best defense: “For it is only if . . . the utterance of the sound ‘Marion’ is truly without any conceivable motive that the total arbitrariness of the action becomes the most effective, the most efficaciously performative excuse of all” (p. 37). Why? Because, “if the essential non-signification of the statement had been properly interpreted, if Rousseau’s accusers had realized that Marion’s name was ‘le premier objet qui s’offrit,’ they would have understood his lack of guilt as well as Marion’s innocence” (p. 40).

But de Man is less interested in the efficacy of the “excuse” than he is in what it reveals about the fundamental nature of language. The fact that the sound “Marion” can mean nothing reminds us that language consists of inherently meaningless sounds to which one adds meanings—in other words, that the relation between signifier and signified is arbitrary. Why does de Man think this apparently uncontroversial description of language has any theoretical interest? The recognition that the material condition of language is inherently meaningless has no theoretical force in itself. But de Man thinks that the material condition of language is not simply meaningless but is also already “linguistic,” that is, sounds are signifiers even before meanings (signifieds) are added to them. As a collection of “pure signifier[s],” in themselves “devoid of meaning and function,” language is primarily a meaningless structure to which meanings are secondarily (and in de Man’s view illegitimately) added (p. 32). Thus, according to de Man, Rousseau’s accusers mistakenly added a meaning to the signifier “Marion”—hearing a speech act where they should have heard only language. This separation of language and speech act is the precondition for de Man’s version of the theoretical choice.

De Man’s separation of language and speech acts rests on a mistake. It is of course true that sounds in themselves are meaningless. It is also

14. Paul de Man, “The Purloined Ribbon,” *Glyph* 1 (1977): 39; all further citations to this work will be included in the text.
true that sounds become signifiers when they function in language. But it is not true that sounds in themselves are signifiers; they become signifiers only when they acquire meanings, and when they lose their meanings they stop being signifiers. De Man’s mistake is to think that the sound “Marion” remains a signifier even when emptied of all meaning. The fact is that the meaningless noise “Marion” only resembles the signifier “Marion,” just as accidentally uttering the sound “Marion” only resembles the speech act of naming Marion. De Man recognizes that the accidental emission of the sound “Marion” is not a speech act (indeed, that’s the point of the example), but he fails to recognize that it’s not language either. What reduces the signifier to noise and the speech act to an accident is the absence of intention. Conceiving linguistic activity as the accidental emission of phonemes, de Man arrives at a vision of “the absolute randomness of language, prior to any figuration or meaning”: “There can be no use of language which is not, within a certain perspective thus radically formal, i.e. mechanical, no matter how deeply this aspect may be concealed by aesthetic, formalistic delusions” (pp. 44, 41).

By conceiving language as essentially random and mechanical, de Man gives a new response to the dilemma of the wave poem and suggests a fuller account of why that dilemma is central to theory in general. Our earlier discussion of the wave poem was intended to show how counterintuitive it is to separate language and intention. When the second stanza washed up on the beach, even the theorist should have been ready to admit that the poem was not a poem because the marks were not language. But our subsequent discussions of Juhl and de Man have revealed that theory precisely depends on not making this admission. For Juhl, the accidental marks remain language, but language in abstracto and hence inherently ambiguous. The wave poem thus presents a positive theorist like Juhl with a choice between the multiple meanings of intentionless marks and the determinate meaning of an intentional speech act. Since the point of positive theory is to ground the practice of determining particular meanings, the positive theorist chooses to read the marks as an intentional act. But when a negative theorist like de Man encounters the second (accidental) stanza, it presents him with a slightly different version of the same choice. For de Man the marks are not multiply meaningful but essentially meaningless, and the choice is not between one intentional meaning and many intentionless meanings but between intentional meaning and no meaning at all. Since, in de Man’s view, all imputations of meaning are equally groundless, the positive theorist’s choice of intention seems to him pointless. In apparent hostility

15. Another, perhaps more usual, way of reaching this notion of the pure signifier is by observing that one signifier can be attached to many different meanings and concluding from this that the signifier has an identity of its own, independent of meaning in general. But the conclusion doesn’t follow. Far from attaining its true identity when unrelated to any meaning, a signifier in this condition merely ceases to be a signifier.
to interpretive method, the negative theorist chooses the meaningless marks. But the negative theorist’s choice in fact provides him with a positive methodology, a methodology that grounds the practice of interpretation in the single decisive truth about language. The truth about language is its accidental and mechanical nature: any text, “properly interpreted,” will reveal its “essential nonsignification” (p. 40). For both Juhl and de Man, proper interpretation depends upon following a methodological prescription. Juhl’s prescription is: when confronted with language, read it as a speech act. De Man’s prescription is: when confronted with what seems to be a speech act, read it as language.

The wave poem, as encountered by a theorist, presents a choice between two kinds of meaning or, what comes to the same thing, two kinds of language. The issue in both cases is the presence or absence of intention; the positive theorist adds intention, the negative theorist subtracts it. In our view, however, the relation between meaning and intention or, in slightly different terms, between language and speech acts is such that intention can neither be added nor subtracted. Intention cannot be added to or subtracted from meaning because meanings are always intentional; intention cannot be added to or subtracted from language because language consists of speech acts, which are also always intentional. Since language has intention already built into it, no recommendation about what to do with intention has any bearing on the question of how to interpret any utterance or text. For the nontheorist, the only question raised by the wave poem is not how to interpret but whether to interpret. Either the marks are a poem and hence a speech act, or they are not a poem and just happen to resemble a speech act. But once this empirical question is decided, no further judgments—and therefore no theoretical judgments—about the status of intention can be made.

4. Theory and Practice

Our argument so far has concerned what might be called the ontological side of theory—its peculiar claims about the nature of its object. We have suggested that those claims always take the form of generating a difference where none in fact exists, by imagining a mode of language devoid of intention—devoid, that is, of what makes it language and distinguishes it from accidental or mechanical noises and marks. But we have also tried to show that this strange ontological project is more than a spontaneous anomaly; it is always in the service of an epistemological

16. At least this is true of the present generation of theorists. For earlier theorists such as W. K. Wimsatt and Monroe C. Beardsley, the objective meanings sought by positive theory were to be acquired precisely by subtracting intention and relying on the formal rules and public norms of language. This, of course, is the view they urge in “The Intentional Fallacy” (The Verbal Icon: Studies in the Meaning of Poetry [Lexington, Ky., 1954], pp. 5–18).
goal. That goal is the goal of method, the governance of interpretive practice by some larger and more principled account. Indeed, theoretical controversy in the Anglo-American tradition has more often taken the form of arguments about the epistemological situation of the interpreter than about the ontological status of the text. If the ontological project of theory has been to imagine a condition of language before intention, its epistemological project has been to imagine a condition of knowledge before interpretation.

The aim of theory’s epistemological project is to base interpretation on a direct encounter with its object, an encounter undistorted by the influence of the interpreter’s particular beliefs. Several writers have demonstrated the impossibility of escaping beliefs at any stage of interpretation and have concluded that theory’s epistemological goal is therefore unattainable. Some have gone on to argue that the unattainability of an epistemologically neutral stance not only undermines the claims of method but prevents us from ever getting any correct interpretations. For these writers the attack on method thus has important practical consequences for literary criticism, albeit negative ones.17

But in discussing theory from the ontological side, we have tried to suggest that the impossibility of method has no practical consequences, positive or negative. And the same conclusion has been reached from the epistemological side by the strongest critic of theoretical attempts to escape belief, Stanley Fish. In his last essay in Is There a Text in This Class?, Fish confronts the “final question” raised by his critique of method, namely, “what implications it has for the practice of literary criticism.” His answer is, “none whatsoever”:

That is, it does not follow from what I have been saying that you should go out and do literary criticism in a certain way or refrain from doing it in other ways. The reason for this is that the position I have been presenting is not one that you (or anyone else) could live by. Its thesis is that whatever seems to you to be obvious and inescapable is only so within some institutional or conventional structure, and that means that you can never operate outside some such structure, even if you are persuaded by the thesis. As soon as you descend from theoretical reasoning about your assumptions, you will once again inhabit them and you will inhabit them without any reservations whatsoever; so that when you are called on to talk

17. Negative theory rests on the perception of what de Man calls “an insurmountable obstacle in the way of any reading or understanding” (Allegories of Reading [New Haven, Conn., 1979], p. 131). Some theorists (e.g., David Bleich and Norman Holland) understand this obstacle as the reader’s subjectivity. Others (like de Man himself and J. Hillis Miller) understand it as the aporia between constative and performative language, between demonstration and persuasion. In all cases, however, the negative theorist is committed to the view that interpretation is, as Jonathan Culler says, “necessary error” (The Pursuit of Signs [Ithaca, N.Y., 1981], p. 14).
about Milton or Wordsworth or Yeats, you will do so from within whatever beliefs you hold about these authors.¹⁸

At the heart of this passage is the familiar distinction between “theoretical reasoning” and the “assumptions” or “beliefs” that inform the concrete “practice of literary criticism.” Where most theorists affirm the practical importance of their theories, Fish’s originality lies in his denial that his theory has any practical consequences whatsoever. But once theory gives up all claims to affect practice, what is there left for theory to do? Or, since Fish’s point is that there is nothing left for theory to do, what is there left for theory to be? Understood in these terms, Fish’s work displays the theoretical impulse in its purest form. Stripped of the methodological project either to ground or to undermine practice, theory continues to imagine a position outside it. While this retreat to a position outside practice looks like theory’s last desperate attempt to save itself, it is really, as we hope to show, the founding gesture of all theoretical argument.

Fish’s attack on method begins with an account of belief that is in our view correct. The account’s two central features are, first, the recognition that beliefs cannot be grounded in some deeper condition of knowledge and, second, the further recognition that this impossibility does not in any way weaken their claims to be true. “If one believes what one believes,” Fish writes, “then one believes that what one believes is true, and conversely, one believes that what one doesn’t believe is not true” (p. 361). Since one can neither escape one’s beliefs nor escape the sense that they are true, Fish rejects both the claims of method and the claims of skepticism. Methodologists and skeptics maintain that the validity of beliefs depends on their being grounded in a condition of knowledge prior to and independent of belief; they differ only about whether this is possible. The virtue of Fish’s account is that it shows why an insistence on the inescapability of belief is in no way inimical to the ordinary notions of truth and falsehood implicit in our sense of what knowledge is. The character of belief is precisely what gives us those notions in the first place; having beliefs just is being committed to the truth of what one believes and the falsehood of what one doesn’t believe. But to say all this is, as Fish asserts, to offer no practical help or hindrance to the task of acquiring true beliefs. We can no more get true beliefs by looking for knowledge than we can get an author’s meaning by looking for his or her intention, and for the same reason: knowledge and true belief are the same.

So far, this argument seems to us flawless. But Fish, as it turns out,

¹⁸. Stanley Fish, Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities (Cambridge, Mass., 1980), p. 370; all further citations to this work will be included in the text.
fails to recognize the force of his own discussion of belief, and this failure is what makes him a theorist. It commits him, ultimately, to the ideal of knowledge implicit in all epistemological versions of theory, and it leads him to affirm, after all, the methodological value of his theoretical stance. Fish’s departure from his account of belief shows up most vividly in his response to charges that his arguments lead to historical relativism. The fear of relativism is a fear that the abandonment of method must make all inquiry pointless. But, Fish rightly says, inquiry never seems pointless; our present beliefs about an object always seem better than any previous beliefs about the same object: “In other words, the idea of progress is inevitable, not, however, because there is a progress in the sense of a clearer and clearer sight of an independent object but because the feeling of having progressed is an inevitable consequence of the firmness with which we hold our beliefs” (pp. 361–62).

As an account of the inevitable psychology of belief, this is irreproachable. But when he later turns from the general issue of intellectual progress to the particular case of progress in literary criticism, Fish makes clear that he thinks our psychological assurance is unfounded. Our present beliefs only seem better than earlier ones; they never really are. And, indeed, the discovery of this truth about our beliefs gives us, Fish thinks, a new understanding of the history of literary criticism and a new sense of how to go about studying it. According to what Fish calls the “old model” for making sense of the history of criticism, the work of critics “like Sidney, Dryden, Pope, Coleridge, Arnold” could only be seen as “the record of the rather dismal performances of men . . . who simply did not understand literature and literary values as well as we do.” But Fish’s new model enables us to “regard those performances not as unsuccessful attempts to approximate our own but as extensions of a literary culture whose assumptions were not inferior but merely different” (pp. 367–68; our emphasis).

To imagine that we can see the beliefs we hold as no better than but “merely different” from opposing beliefs held by others is to imagine a position from which we can see our beliefs without really believing them. To be in this position would be to see the truth about beliefs without actually having any—to know without believing. In the moment in which he imagines this condition of knowledge outside belief, Fish has forgotten the point of his own earlier identification of knowledge and true belief.

Once a theorist has reached this vision of knowledge, there are two epistemological ways to go: realism and idealism. A realist thinks that theory allows us to stand outside our beliefs in a neutral encounter with the objects of interpretation; an idealist thinks that theory allows us to stand outside our beliefs in a neutral encounter with our beliefs themselves. The issue in both cases is the relation between objects and beliefs.
For the realist, the object exists independent of beliefs, and knowledge requires that we shed our beliefs in a disinterested quest for the object. For the idealist, who insists that we can never shed our beliefs, knowledge means recognizing the role beliefs play in constituting their objects. Fish, with his commitment to the primacy of beliefs, chooses idealism: “objects,” he thinks, “are made and not found”; interpretation “is not the art of construing but the art of constructing” (pp. 331, 327). Once he arrives at epistemological idealism, Fish’s methodological payoff immediately follows. Knowing that “interpreters do not decode poems” but “make them,” “we are free to consider the various forms the literary institution has taken and to uncover the interpretative strategies by which its canons have been produced and understood” (pp. 327, 368).

By thinking of the critic as an idealist instead of a realist, Fish is able to place literary criticism at the very center of all literary practice:

No longer is the critic the humble servant of texts whose glories exist independently of anything he might do; it is what he does, within the constraints embedded in the literary institution, that brings texts into being and makes them available for analysis and appreciation. The practice of literary criticism is not something one must apologize for; it is absolutely essential not only to the maintenance of, but to the very production of, the objects of its attention. [P. 368]

We began this section by noting that Fish, like us, thinks that no general account of belief can have practical consequences. But, as we have just seen, his account turns out to have consequences after all. Why, then, is Fish led both to assert that his argument has no practical consequences and to proclaim its importance in providing a new model for critical practice? The answer is that, despite his explicit disclaimers, he thinks a true account of belief must be a theory about belief, whereas we think a true account of belief can only be a belief about belief.19 The difference between these two senses of what it means to have a true account of something is the difference between theory and the kind of pragmatist argument we are presenting here. These two kinds of positions conceive their inconsequentiality in two utterly different ways. A belief about the nature of beliefs is inconsequential because it merely tells you what beliefs are, not whether they are true or false in particular or in general. From this point of view, knowing the truth about belief will no more help you in acquiring true beliefs than knowing that meaning is intentional will help you find correct meanings. This is not in the least to

19. Fish calls his account a “general or metacritical belief” (Is There a Text in This Class?, p. 359; cf. pp. 368–70).
say that you can’t have true beliefs, only that you can’t get them by having a good account of what beliefs are.

Fish’s theory about beliefs, on the other hand, strives to achieve inconsequentiality by standing outside all the practical commitments that belief entails. It is perfectly true that one can achieve inconsequentiality by going outside beliefs but only because, as Fish himself insists, to be outside beliefs is to be nowhere at all. But of course Fish doesn’t think that his theory about beliefs leaves him nowhere at all; he thinks instead that it gives him a way of arriving at truth, not by choosing some beliefs over others but by choosing beliefless knowledge over all beliefs. The truth of knowledge, according to Fish, is that no beliefs are, in the long run, truer than others; all beliefs, in the long run, are equal. But, as we have noted, it is only from the standpoint of a theory about belief which is not itself a belief that this truth can be seen. Hence the descent from “theoretical reasoning” about our beliefs to the actual practice of believing—from neutrality to commitment—demands that we forget the truth theory has told us. Unlike the ordinary methodologist, Fish wants to repudiate the attempt to derive practice from theory, insisting that the world of practice must be founded not on theoretical truth but on the repression of theoretical truth. But the sense that practice can only begin with the repression of theory already amounts to a methodological prescription: when confronted with beliefs, forget that they are not really true. This prescription gives Fish everything theory always wants: knowledge of the truth-value of beliefs and instructions on what to do with them.

We can now see why Fish, in the first passage quoted, says that his position is “not one that you (or anyone else) could live by . . . even if you [were] persuaded” by it. Theory, he thinks, can have no practical consequences; it cannot be lived because theory and practice—the truth about belief and belief itself—can never in principle be united. In our view, however, the only relevant truth about belief is that you can’t go outside it, and, far from being unlivable, this is a truth you can’t help but live. It has no practical consequences not because it can never be separated with practice but because it can never be separated from practice.

The theoretical impulse, as we have described it, always involves the attempt to separate things that should not be separated: on the ontological side, meaning from intention, language from speech acts; on the epistemological side, knowledge from true belief. Our point has been that the separated terms are in fact inseparable. It is tempting to end by saying that theory and practice too are inseparable. But this would be a mistake. Not because theory and practice (unlike the other terms) really

20. In one respect Fish’s prescription is unusual: it separates the two theoretical goals of grounding practice and reaching objective truth. It tells us what is true and how to behave—but not how to behave in order to find out what is true.
are separate but because theory is nothing else but the attempt to escape practice. Meaning is just another name for expressed intention, knowledge just another name for true belief, but theory is not just another name for practice. It is the name for all the ways people have tried to stand outside practice in order to govern practice from without. Our thesis has been that no one can reach a position outside practice, that theorists should stop trying, and that the theoretical enterprise should therefore come to an end.