13 November 1992

Dear Mark,

Thanks for your kind note regarding my lecture. One thing that I forgot to say, as I got into the talk, was that I was amused and complimented by your asking me to do it; I don't think the topic you suggested is one that many people would ask me to discuss. But I enjoyed the experience. As for your students' views of what occurred during the question period, well, they simply don't understand the nature of open discussion, do they?

Your first question was, "Is this conception of strong and weak senses of knowing a logical or a psychological matter?" My answer was that I would like to make it a logical matter, but it probably is psychological. Afterward, when I could relax and think about the matter, I realized what "I shoulda said." If knowing is a species of belief (true, justified belief, or at least justified belief), then the entire matter is psychological. And I think that's appropriate. We are talking (as I keep telling students) about something that humans are doing, not about something that gods or computers might do. Humans believe. Humans claim to know. And if I had really been thinking clearly at the time, I would have explained what Alvin Goldman explains at the beginning of his book *Epistemology and Cognition*: That we are talking about mental states, which are of two kinds--propositional attitudes and qualia--and that propositional attitudes include doxastic or credal attitudes, such as believing and knowing. So the whole business is fundamentally psychological, although it has something of a logical aspect to it. I have never really sorted out the matter of what is logical and what is psychological. For instance, are the fundamental laws of logic statements about the way the world must necessarily be (everything is necessarily either X or non-X) or about human psychology? I don't know. I don't know if anyone can give a good answer to such questions.

Anyway, thank you, Mark. I did enjoy the experience.

Best wishes,

Burt Guttman