Kevin Howard
Red Spring:The Kwangju Uprising and The American Connection

I shall not return having once stepped into this place
If I sleep, it is the sleep which cuts deeply into the flesh
That sleep, that white room, that bottomless vertigo

-- Kim Chi Ha, dissident poet In Korea

No Return
Spring is a season for rejuvenation as warm temperatures and blue skies bid a final farewell to the frigid Korean winter. It is a time for hope and optimism; that the year’s rice harvest will be rich and the family’s fortunes will be many. For Koreans longing for a new democracy after years of totalitarian military regimes, the spring of 1980 must have seemed particularly sunny. President Park Chung Hee had been assassinated the previous October, and the seeds of hope for Korea’s first successful democratic transition of government had been planted. Joyful optimism soon turned to fear, anger, and mistrust as pro-democracy demonstrations nationwide provoked an immediate and determined response from the interim government, ostensibly civilian in nature but in actuality, a military establishment working behind the scene and led by Chun Doo Hwan, an army general with political ambition.

Although anti-government demonstrations were frequent in many of Korea’s cities, the response of the riot police was generally benign. Indeed, the students leading the demonstrations usually displayed more aggressive behavior, utilizing rocks and Molotov cocktails to engage the authorities. That changed during eleven days in May, 1980. In Kwangju, the provincial capital of South Cholla province, a civil uprising, sparked by outrage over the violent response of the Korean army troops sent in to quell the demonstrations, changed forever the process of Korean governance. The Kwangju Uprising dramatically altered the course of Korean politics and still reverberates today as a watershed event in modern Korean history. During the uprising, the citizens of Kwangju rose up in anger and protest over the brutal tactics of the elite Special Warfare troops against demonstrating students. Incensed at the savagery of the military, students and ordinary citizens joined forces and drove the army out of the city, having armed themselves with weapons from the local armory. For several days an uneasy truce existed as negotiations with the government ensued. Finally, Chun ordered the army to retake the city and when the dust settled, the streets of Kwangju were silent and bloody. Government figures tally the deaths at 193. Civilian sources in Kwangju place the death toll much higher, around two thousand.

Today, Kwangju is still fresh in the minds of Koreans and has been a rallying cry for democracy ever since. The Kwangju Uprising was the first time in Korea’s post war history that university students, longstanding agents for political change in Korea, were joined by elements of the middle class in a common struggle against the forces of government. The effect of Kwangju on contemporary Korean politics cannot be underestimated. It was a turning point in Korea’s fledgling experience with democracy.

There are still, however, unanswered questions concerning the uprising. Paramount among them is the role of the United States in the Korean government‘s response to the events in Kwangju. Was the American government blindsided by the actions of the Korean military? Or was the United States government entirely complicit? The vast majority of Koreans believe the latter and injudicious actions and statements on the part of the Americans have done little to disprove that sentiment. Evidence suggests that the truth lies somewhere in between. It can be argued, however, that the inability of the American military commanders to contemplate anything beyond their assigned mission of deterring the North Korean threat as a prominent consideration, coupled with an astonishing naiveté on their part concerning the motives and aspirations of Chun Doo Hwan, undoubtedly contributed to the perception among Koreans that the United States, if not specifically involved, at the very least looked the other way. Consequently, the Kwangju uprising, besides being a critical juncture in Korean democracy, has also become the rallying cry for a new wave of anti-Americanism that has clouded the waters of what has traditionally been a strong, if uneven, alliance between the two countries.

The events of May 1980 did not develop in a vacuum. Demonstrations against Chun’s government had been held in much larger cities, including Seoul, the nation’s capital, as well as in Pusan and Taegu, located in Kyongsang province, an area usually supportive of government policies. Why then, did Chun unleash the military on Kwangju instead of Seoul or other cities where demonstrations were being held? The answer comes from many directions; from provincial animosity, the role of the military in Korean politics, the Cholla provinces’ history of radical behavior, even the geography of the country. Similarly, disparate circumstances influenced the actions of the Americans. In Korea, nothing is ever black and white.

Historical Considerations
Throughout the four thousand years of Korean history, kingdoms and armies have vied for control of the strategically placed peninsula. Jutting out from the Chinese mainland, Korea points like a dagger towards the heart of Japan. Repeated invasions throughout the centuries by Mongols, Chinese, and the Japanese, resulted in the Koreans effectively shutting themselves off from the rest of the world.

It wasn’t until the late nineteenth century that Western nations, most notably Germany, France, and the United States, sought inroads into Korea for purposes of commerce. A naval landing was attempted in 1866 by the Americans, who sailed up the Taedong River near present day Pyongyang demanding trade negotiations. The Koreans were angered by the bellicose attitude of the Americans and attacked the USS General Sherman, setting it afire. Later that same year, an attempted encroachment by French naval forces on Kanghwa island north of Seoul was similarly repulsed by a Korean garrison. Korea’s reputation as the Hermit Kingdom was well deserved. However, she was not able to remain insulated from the outside world unfolding around her. In the early years of the twentieth century, Japan, fresh from her victory in the Russo-Japanese war, turned her attention to her neighbor to the west. In 1910, Japan forcibly annexed Korea and ruled her with an iron fist for thirty-five years. Koreans were not permitted to speak their own language and were forced to take Japanese surnames. Reaction to these policies took the form of underground activities in country and overtures to friendly governments by Koreans living abroad. The Korean democracy movement overseas was particularly active in the United States, China, and Russia. Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points in particular served as an inspiration to Korean advocates of democracy, however, Wilson refused to intercede on Korea’s behalf. It can be argued that the Korean tradition of popular dissent against authority had its genesis during the Japanese occupation. Demonstrations were common, usually by students, and were suppressed with force by the Japanese. Executions were commonplace. Korean resistance was active throughout the country, with numerous rebellions and uprisings, often in the Cholla provinces.
With Japan’s defeat in World War II, the occupation ended, however, Korea’s liberation was short lived. Jockeying for position in Asia, the Americans and the Russians established plans to receive the surrender of Japanese forces in Korea with the Americans taking the southern half of the peninsula and the Russians taking the north. The 38th parallel was established as the line of demarcation between the two halves1.
Many Koreans, infuriated at the division of the country and at what they saw as yet another occupation, reacted, sometimes violently, calling for free and open elections. In the southern half of the peninsula, specifically the Cholla and Kyongsang provinces, Koreans fought against the American occupation. The insurrections were suppressed, usually with loss of life, by the Korean National Police, who had been elevated from their role as muscle for the Japanese to being charged with maintaining law and order for the young republic. The KNP were hated by the vast majority of Koreans who viewed them at best as lackeys for the power elite and at worst willful collaborators of the Japanese.

American advisors and representatives responsible for helping the Koreans establish a western style government based upon American principles made several tactical mistakes in this endeavor. Arriving in Korea, they reached out and established relationships with wealthy and powerful Korean landowners, often on the basis of their ability to speak English. It never occurred to the Americans that these Koreans obtained their wealth and kept their land by collaborating with the Japanese during the occupation and consequently were reviled by the vast majority of Koreans. Eager to retain their assets, these affluent Koreans quickly endeared themselves to the Americans and eventually, along with the old patriot Syngman Rhee, positioned themselves as the foundation of the new Korean government. To suppress dissent (and to keep themselves safe from vengeful Koreans) these new government officials employed the services of the KNP to extinguish peasant uprisings in the provinces. To ordinary Koreans, this government, established by former collaborators under the guidance of a foreign occupying power, had no legitimacy. The Korean people, starved for representative government, continued to push for popular elections. As this subverted form of democracy was struggling to gain a foothold in the south, the Russians were establishing a communist government in the North, led by Kim Il Sung, a Korean guerrilla leader who fought against the Japanese. In the eyes of many in the north and south, this government more accurately reflected the aspirations and desires of the Korean people than the one established by the Americans. Nevertheless, in 1948 the Republic of Korea was born with Syngman Rhee as its first president.

In 1950, North Korean forces invaded the south and after three years of war, a truce was declared, ending the conflict but cementing the division of a country that had been in existence for over four thousand years. The threat of North Korean aggression, real or perceived, would be the foundation for a series of authoritarian regimes in South Korea for the next forty years.

The First Republic, as the government of Syngman Rhee was known, was overthrown in 1960 by a mass of student unrest and demonstrations after a blatantly rigged presidential election. The killing of a student in the southern port city of Masan by authorities prompted more demonstrations and riots. The Korean National Police fired into the crowd, killing several. Rhee declared martial law, but the election, along with massive unemployment, and the heavy handed tactics of the KNP, had resulted in strong discontent among Koreans and after nationwide demonstrations, Rhee stepped down as President. Notable here is the role of the Korean Army in these disturbances. Nonexistent during the Japanese occupation, the Korean Army was developed, trained, and molded into a decent fighting force by American advisors. They fought valiantly during the Korean War and after the conflict became an institution admired and respected by many Koreans. They carried none of the baggage of the KNP. During the riots of 1960, army commanders refused to order their soldiers to fire on demonstrators. This is an important consideration as we will see. In July 1960, Yun Po Sun was elected President and Chang Myon elected Prime Minister. This new government’s brief legacy was one of relative political freedom, marred by internecine squabbles among rival factions in the government. This new freedom was, in the eyes of military leaders, a dangerous precedent. They feared instability which might lead to opportunistic aggression on the part of North Korea. In 1961, Major General Park Chung Hee led a coup against the government and in short order, established himself as President. This was not an especially unwelcome development for many Koreans for whom the war was still a very fresh memory. The coup of 1961 is particularly important because it marked the end of Korea’s experiment with democracy, however flawed it might be, and introduced a period of Army control over Korean affairs that would last for the next twenty six years.

During Park’s reign from 1961 to 1979, he presided over unprecedented economic growth in Korea at the expense of low paid workers with no union representation. Labor movements were quickly and severely repressed. Criticism of the state was not tolerated. Due in no small part to Park’s intolerance of popular dissent, calls for democracy were somewhat subdued as Koreans saw their standard of living increase in the face of a demonstrable communist threat mere miles away from the capitol city of Seoul. Unfortunately, the distribution of wealth was grossly unfair to the citizens of Cholla.

Park Chung Hee, as well as many officials in his government, hailed from the Kyongsang provinces in the southeastern part of Korea. The Kyongsang and Cholla provinces to the southwest are geographically divided by the rugged Sobaek mountain range. By the seventh century AD, three kingdoms existed in almost total autonomy: Koguryo in the north, Silla in the southeast, and Paekche in the southwest. In 660 AD, Silla, allied with China, conquered Paekche and several years later, unified the entire peninsula. Because of these historical conflicts, as well as the relative isolation of the southwest, there developed an animosity between the Kyongsang and the Cholla provinces that matured into a divisive regionalism that still exists today. During his presidency, Park directed the nation’s new found wealth primarily towards Seoul and his own province. The Cholla provinces saw very little if any benefits from this new prosperity. It was still primarily agrarian with little industry. Roads went unrepaired. Communications were sparse. To exacerbate things, South Cholla province was also home to Kim Dae Jung, the nations most popular and outspoken opposition leader. His repeated criticisms of the Park regime and his frequent calls for democratic elections certainly did not set well with Park. In 1971, Kim Dae Jung came very close to upsetting Park in a presidential election. In response, Park cracked down on opposition efforts, declaring martial law in 1972 and promulgating his Yushin (revitalization) Constitution in 1973 which solidified his power by removing all presidential term limits and authorizing the restriction of civil liberties at his discretion. In 1974, agents of the Korean CIA kidnapped Kim Dae Jung from his hotel in Tokyo and placed him under house arrest. Additionally, Park imprisoned dissident poet Kim Chi Ha, also from South Cholla province, on the charge of sedition. Park’s actions crippled the opposition movement and for awhile, things were quiet. All that changed in October 1979.

On October 12, 1979, Park Chung Hee was assassinated by his own CIA chief. Since Park held such a stranglehold on the Korean political system, his death plunged the government into confusion. An interim government, led by Choi Kyu Hah, was established and once again, the Korean people began to clamor for democratic elections. Initially, Choi seemed to support that goal. On November 10, Choi addressed the subject of elections by saying, “I believe the new president….should, at the earliest possible date, ….amend the constitution and conduct elections in compliance with the amended constitution.“2 This sense of a new beginning was also felt in Washington where the Carter Administration, long at odds with the Park regime over human rights, pushed for democratic reforms while at the same time warning North Korea not to take military advantage of the situation. Cyrus Vance, Carter’s Secretary of State announced “We hope that political growth in the Republic of Korea will be commensurate with economic and social progress.“3 In retrospect, it seems that Carter was naïve in his hope that the military would sit back and allow democratic elections. The United States did not recognize the degree to which the Korean military, particularly the Army, was involved in national politics. In November, the head of the Defense Security Command, Major General Chun Doo Hwan, also a native of Kyongsang Province, declared a state of martial law to combat the growing unrest among students who had once again taken to the streets to demonstrate, calling for free elections.

Coinciding with the burgeoning unrest, another drama was being played out in the ranks of the military. Dissension among younger officers, many of them from the 11th graduating class of the Korean Military Academy (KMA), began to take shape. These younger generals saw themselves as more competent and more capable than the current flock of generals, most of them being from the 8th graduating class of the KMA. The young generals were led by Major General Chun. When Chun heard that the current Chief of Staff of the Army, General Chung, was planning to reassign him to an isolated post on the east coast, the ambitious young general made his move.

The Night of the Generals
On December 12, 1979, General Chung was arrested by forces loyal to Chun Doo Hwan. To support Chun’s coup against the top echelons of the military, several South Korean army units loyal to Chun left their area of responsibility and headed towards Seoul. This removal of troops from their assigned sectors was anathema to the American Commander, General Wickham. As head of the Combined Forces Command, Wickham had operational control over these Korean units and to have them leave their assigned positions to support a military coup without the permission of the commander was unthinkable. Moving units with proper notification and approval was not unknown. After Park’s assassination, the Koreans requested they be able to assume operational control (OPCON) of the 20th Division, usually under the control of CFC, to protect Seoul against any civil disorders. This request was granted. However, on December 12, the movement of these units without notification seriously degraded CFC’s effectiveness in the event of a North Korean attack. Wickham was understandably furious but was helpless to affect the outcome since by the time he was made aware of the movements, it was too late to do anything about it. The coup, known today as the 12/12 incident, was over before the dawn. The morning of December 13th found the Army Chief of Staff under arrest and Chun Doo Hwan effectively in control of the Korean Army. In his excellent book, Eye on Korea, James Young, who had served as the Defense Military Attaché in the American Embassy, addresses the role of the United States military leadership in the 12/12 incident, saying, “Simply stated, we had no prior knowledge that a coup was imminent, though perhaps we should have.”4 In fact, Wickham had revealed his concerns to the Korean Minister of Defense and to his own Korean deputy commander. Both assured Wickham that the rumors of a military coup were unfounded. As it was, they were also in the dark. Once again, this points out the naiveté of the Americans. In the United States, the military serves at the behest of their civilian government. They don’t make policy, they execute it. In Seoul, American military leaders were focused exclusively on the threat from North Korea. They were not looking for problems from the South Koreans. This “head in the sand” mentality on the part of the American military leadership would have disastrous effects just five months later.

The Kwangju Uprising
After the 12/12 incident, Washington released a statement outlining the official American stance on the coup: “As a result of events yesterday in Korea, we have instructed our ambassador and the Commander of US Forces in Korea to point out to all concerned that any forces within the ROK (Republic of Korea) which disrupt this progress (of developing a broadly based government) should bear in mind the serious adverse impact their actions would have on the ROK’s relations with the United Statespo.“5 These goals were consistent with previously held statements, specifically that governments could prosper only with the support of the people. Chun repeatedly denied any personal ambition; however, his words were compromised by his actions as he moved quickly to consolidate his power. Engineering his promotion to full general and establishing himself as the head of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, Chun now wielded absolute control over the Korean Army, and by extension the Korean government. It was becoming evident to the Korean populace, as well as to the American leadership, that the government of President Choi was powerless to stop Chun’s ambitions. Nevertheless, the United States continued to express support for President Choi and urged the resumption of the democratic process.

From mid-April to mid-May, coordinated demonstrations against Chun among university students on campuses across Korea were nearly a daily occurrence. Primary among their demands was an end to martial law, Chun’s resignation, and an end to mandatory military service (this last demand was later dropped from the students’ platform). In addition, the students were joined by workers clamoring for higher wages amidst rampant inflation. Thirty-five thousand demonstrate in Kwangju.

Finally, the government cracked down. On May 17, Chun declared nationwide martial law (existing martial law did not extend to the southern island of Cheju). He also banned all political activity, shut down universities, and prevented the National Assembly from meeting. The National Assembly had scheduled a vote on the existing martial law and was widely expected to repeal it. Many were arrested, prominent among them Kim Dae Jung and Kim Chong Pil, a potential presidential candidate. For several days, the capital city of Seoul enjoyed relative quiet as the military edicts went into effect. Down in the rebellious South Cholla province, however, students in Kwangju, incensed at the arrest of Kwangju’s favorite son, Kim Dae Jung, continued to demonstrate in the face of Chun’s order, On May 18, on Chun’s orders, soldiers from the martial law command, augmented by soldiers from the Special Warfare Command, nicknamed “the Black Berets”, entered Kwangju and, singling out students, began to indiscriminately assault them. This continued on May 19th, with the violence escalating to a degree not seen before in previous government responses to student demonstrations. Students and citizens alike were beaten bloody with nightsticks, others kicked into unconsciousness, and still others bayoneted. Many were killed outright, filling up morgues and school gymnasiums with bodies. Hospitals were overflowing with injured people. On May 20, the citizenry of Kwangju, furious at the behavior of the army, in particular that of the Special Warfare Command troops, stage a massive demonstration of about 100,000 people. The next day, the number of demonstrators grew to 200,000. Citizens from all classes of society, from housewives to businessmen to middle school students, filled the streets raging against the violence perpetuated by the soldiers. Army vehicles were commandeered, and townspeople armed themselves with weapons obtained from local armories, captured military personnel, and police stations. The citizens of Kwangju often turned their fury on captured paratroopers. In one eyewitness account, an old man tried to help a female street vender who intervened to stop a soldier from chasing several fleeing demonstrators. The soldier swung his baton at the man’s head screaming, “You bitch! You bastard! You let them get away!” The students he had been chasing suddenly turned and charged the soldier who tried to run. Captured by other citizens, he was beaten and thrown off the Yangmim Bridge and stoned to death by rocks thrown from above.6 The soldiers retreat to the outskirts of the city on May 22 and for the next six days, Kwangju is held by its own citizens. During the standoff, negotiations commence between citizen representatives and the government. General Wickham releases Korean troops from his command at the request of Korean military authorities to reinforce units in Kwangju. This decision, which Wickham made based on logical reasoning, was later cited by Koreans as proof that the US was involved in Kwangju. In reality, Wickham released units from the 20th Infantry Division because the 20th was one of the few units in the Korean Army that was trained in riot control and Wickham figured that they would be a better fit in Kwangju than the Special Warfare Troops who had by this time effectively demonstrated their lack of training in riot control.

During the next few days, peaceful demonstrations are carried out. Most of the weapons commandeered by the people are returned. Finally, in the early hours of May 27, the army reentered Kwangju, again led by the Special Warfare Troops. Many people, including student leaders, are killed, fired upon while surrendering. One paratrooper, his foot on the back of a student, looked down on his captive and joked, “How was that? Was it like a movie?”7

By the next day, May 28th, the army was again in control of Kwangju. The city was quiet. Parents searched the morgues and hospitals for their sons and daughters. Terry Anderson, the renowned journalist, was in Kwangju covering the events for the Associated Press. He reported counting 179 bodies in just one day: “..physically counted them, one, two, three. Whole bodies, parts of bodies, damaged bodies. The smell!”8

Most of the true heroes of Kwangju will never be known but to their families. Many were mere high school students prepared to die for what they believed in. Yun Sang Won was a charismatic student who, on May 26, sent a request to Ambassador Gleysteen via a New York Times correspondent asking him to mediate a truce between the citizens of Kwangju and the military command. Ambassador Gleysteen declined. He recounts, “I first heard of it (the request) around 11 p.m. after I had been officially informed the Korean forces would reenter Kwangju within two or three hours. I was unable to discover essential details or the context of the request; I was certain I could not succeed because Korean troops were already authorized and poised to move into Kwangju.9” On May 28th, the body of Yun Sang Won was found in the main Provincial Building, shot to death.

After twelve days the insurrection was over and an uneasy calm settled over Kwangju as the townspeople struggled with the horror of what had just happened. Arrests and interrogations continued while in Seoul, Kim Dae Jung is charged with sedition, an offense that carries a potential death penalty. In August, Chun resigns from the army and several days later is elected President by the South Korean electoral college.

Demonstrations had long been an accepted form of protest in Korea and while riot police were deployed to keep the demonstrations in check, the cat and mouse game played by the police and demonstrators usually did not exceed rock throwing and flaming cocktails. I personally witnessed one such demonstration in 1987 and from my vantage point on a bridge overlooking a main thoroughfare in Seoul, it looked more like a well choreographed dance with the students advancing, then retreating, then advancing again. There was much shouting of slogans and waving of placards but not much violence.

Why then was the uprising in Kwangju put down with such excessive force? This reaction on the part of authorities to demonstrations was not the norm. Telling evidence can be found in the words of a paratrooper captured by townspeople who asked him why the soldiers had been so brutal. He replied that they had not been fed in three days but had been given alcohol prior to their entry into the city.10 Additionally, many citizens had reported that the soldiers spoke with a Kyongsang accent, a discovery that was sure to inflame the populace. In fact, during the uprising, an innocent truck driver was pulled from his vehicle by an angry crowd that saw the truck’s Kyongsang license plate and would surely have been harmed had not cooler heads prevailed.11

Aftermath
American actions and statements both during and after Kwangju only seemed to reinforce the popularly held belief that the United States was deeply involved. A statement issued by the State Department on May 18, said in part: “Progress toward political liberalization must be accompanied by respect for the law. However, we are concerned that the actions which the government has now taken will exacerbate problems in the ROK.”12 On May 22, during the height of the uprising, Ambassador Gleysteen composed a forcefully worded statement addressing the actions of the Korean military in Kwangju. Unfortunately, the statement was released in Washington, not Korea. And inexplicably, American officials both in Washington and Seoul, took the Korean military at their word when they promised to broadcast the statement in Korea and to drop leaflets of the statement. Obviously, neither was done. What the ROK authorities did, however, was to broadcast over Korean radio that General Wickham had encouraged the deployment of forces to Kwangju. This was a half truth; Wickham had authorized release of the 20th Division from his operational control because of their riot control training and a wish to reign in the Special Warfare troops. To the Korean public, this was damning evidence of American culpability.

In 1981, the first foreign dignitary to be received by the newly inaugurated President Reagan, was President Chun Doo Hwan of South Korea. This invite was extended in return for the commutation of Kim Dae Jung’s death sentence on charges of sedition, but again, it left a lasting impression on Koreans. Also, in 1989, a Korean government committee established to investigate the Kwangju uprising, requested that Ambassador Gleysteen and General Wickham return to Korea to answer specific questions. This would have been in important gesture that might have had a significant impact on public perception in Korea, however, the United States refused, saying it would be inappropriate. Instead, the American embassy in Seoul took the lead in preparing the United States Government Statement on the Events in Kwangju, Republic of Korea, in May 1980. It contained written answers to questions posed by the Koreans and generally supported the American claim that the Kwangju Uprising was beyond their control and they had no role in the suppression of the demonstrations. This claim is still largely panned today in Korea. Recent actions by the current administration towards the rest of the world in general and toward North Korea in particular have not helped heal the negative impression of America in the eyes of many Koreans. In 1995, Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo, a general involved in the 12/12 incident and Chun’s successor as president, were arrested, brought to trial, and subsequently convicted of mutiny, treason, and bribery. Chun was sentenced to death and Roh to life imprisonment. In 1997, both sentences were commuted by the President of South Korea: Kim Dae Jung.

Korea today is vastly different from the Korea of 1980. Democracy is thriving.
The economy is again on the rise. The scars of Kwangju are fading, but still serve as a reminder of the terrible price that sometimes must be paid for true democracy to take root.

NOTES1. The circumstances upon which the 38th parallel was chosen as the line of demarcation is particularly interesting. Major Dean Rusk and Colonel Charles Bonesteel were ordered by the US State Department to select a dividing line that would be the most beneficial to the Americans. In his book The Origins of The Korean War, Bruce Cumings suggests that this choice of demarcation was made to insure that Seoul remained in the American sector. The Americans were surprised when the Russians accepted the 38th parallel as the separation line. The Russians entered the northern half of the peninsula a full month before the Americans entered the south and there was really nothing to stop the Russians from advancing into the southern sector. Nevertheless, the Russians honored the 38th parallel as the demarcation line.
2. Gleysteen, William Jr. Massive Entanglement, Marginal Influence: Carter and Korea in Crisis. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999. pp. 69.
3. ibid. pp. 67.
4. Young, James. Eye on Korea. College Station, TX. Texas A&M University Press, 2003. pp.73.
5. Wickham, John A. Korea on the Brink: A memoir of Political Intrigue and Military Crisis. Washington DC.: Brassey’s, 2000. pp.71.
6. Lee Jae Eui, Kwangju Diary: Beyond Death, Beyond the Darkness of the Age. Los Angeles. UCLA Asian Pacific Monograph Series, University of California, Los Angeles. pp. 58. This book provides possibly the best day by day accounting of the events of Kwangju.
7. ibid. pg 147.
8. ibid. pg. 139.
9. Gleysteen, William Jr. Massive Entanglement, pp. 140.
10. Clark, Donald N. ed. The Kwangju Uprising: Shadows Over the Regime in South Korea. Boulder, Colorado and London, Westview Press, 1988. pp. 22.
11. Lee, Jae Eui. Kwangju Diary. Pp.61.
12. Wickham, John A. Korea on the Brink. pp 128.

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