The Language of Politics

According to Richard Delgado, it is possible to identify hate speech on the use of certain key-words, arguing that "Words such as 'nigger', 'spic', 'kike', 'chink' and 'wop' are badges of degradation even when used between friends: these words have no other connotation." Therefore, the act of calling someone a name should be censored if the name used belongs to a previously-identified hate speech. However, Judith Butler (1997) claims that "this very statement, whether written in his text or cited here, has another connotation; he has just used the word in a significantly different way." (Butler considers that "mentioning" a word is an effective "use" of the word in another context)^[7] On this basis, Butler claims that words do not have an absolute meaning, but one that depends on the context. She thus underlines the difficulty of identifying a hate-speech. Ultimately, the state itself defines the limits of acceptable discourse, according to her. However, Butler takes the precaution to explicitly deny being against all forms of limitation of discourse, the object of her book being only to point out the different issues at stake when one address the problem of hate speech and censorship. She points out, for example, that the very act of forbidding hate-speech reconducts this hate-speech, as quoted by juridical authorities, thus leading to a proliferation of this discourse - Butler's reasoning here follows Michel Foucault's statement according to which sexuality has not only been censored during the Victorian era: it was also put in discourse through a "sexuality dispositif", thus transforming "sex" into what the West names "sexuality". In this case, censorship of sexuality has made the discourse of sexuality proliferate, with the constitution of a huge amount of scientific or pseudo-scientific literature on "sexuality", conceived as the secret of our own personal identities.

There are a number of arguments suggested against the prohibition of hate speech:

• As a form of censorship, prohibiting hate speech would interfere with the right of free expression and free discussion of opinions, as well as with freedom of the press.

• The difficulty of defining "hate speech". A legal definition would need to provide clear guidance to an individual speaker or writer, and to prosecutors, judges and juries involved in the prosecution of "hate speech". Any ambiguity or lack of clarity and specificity in such definitions would necessarily result in arbitrary and unpredictable decisions. Judith Butler thus argues that, in the US, it is jurisprudence which defines "hate speech", and not always in a "progressive" way.

• Specifically, prohibiting "hate speech" would effectively invest government prosecutors with wide discretion to persecute and silence expressions of certain opinions as "hate speech" based on political convenience while ignoring equally "hateful" expressions which have the support of vocal or violent groups.

• Hate speech restrictions would be attempts to control not only the relevant speech actions, but the thoughts of individuals, and would thus be an attempt to create a kind of thoughtcrime.

• Even if used, hate speech does not necessarily lead to actions, and that where actions are carried out, the speaker of those words cannot be held responsible for the actions of others. Critics of this position hold that position depends on denying what they argue as historical truths (i.e. that hate speech in practice has been used to incite murder and genocide). They also underline that the definition itself of "hate speech" entails a continuing line between words and acts, generally following J.L. Austin's performative concept of speech acts.

• Prohibiting hate speech would do nothing to change the ideas that give rise to the opinions behind the "offensive" terms. On this view, it is agreed that hate speech may be dangerous and should not exist, but suggested that we should not attempt to end it by legislative action, as opposed to debate and discussion. The antirevisionist Nizkor Project follows such a stance.

• In some cases it is held that prohibiting hate speech would be part of a campaign of political correctness intended to censor any expression of certain ideas, even if there is no accompanying incitement to hatred or criminal action. In addition, criminalizing hate speech could lead to a "slippery slope" effect where other groups currently not considered to be "protected minorities" (such as fat people or people from lower socioeconomic classes) could be given protected status and therefore protected from hate speech directed toward them.

• Hate speech would not necessarily lead to racial hatred. Some argue that people's common sense makes them repulsed by hate speech, which should therefore be openly expressed. Justice Brandeis, who endorsed this view, famously wrote, "Sunshine is the best disinfectant." This argument may be tied to Habermas's theory of a transparent discourse, where pure rationality leads to a final consensus (i.e. he trusts rationality to crush hate speech). Critics of this position argue that hate speech, such as the Nazis' anti-Semitism, were undisturbed by logical reasoning. Or, as Slavoj Zizek puts it:

"How are we to combat effectively this Id-Evil [reference to Freud's Id and maybe Kant's radical evil] which, on account of its 'elementary' nature, remains impervious to any rational or even purely rhetorical argumentation? That is to say, racism is always grounded in a particular fantasy (of cosa nostra, of our ethnic Thing menaced by 'them', of 'them' who, by means of their excessive enjoyment, pose a threat to our 'way of life') which, by definition, resists universalization. The translation of the racist fantasy into the universal medium of symbolic intersubjectivity (the Habermasien ethics of dialogue) in no way weakens the hold of the racist fantasy upon us."^[8]

• Freedom of speech is argued by many writers to be the most basic freedom. The essayist and novelist George Orwell said “If liberty means anything at all, it means the right to tell people what they do not want to hear.” Orwell argues that a society that is too careful not to offend cannot be truthfully expressive, artistic, or diverse. Taking offense to speech is an arbitrary response. To account for every possible way a phrase may be found offensive is not only impossible, but a hindrance to freedom of expression and even thought.

• Prohibiting hate speech can produce sympathy for its promoters, on the argument "If they are trying so hard to suppress it, there must be something in it".

• Prohibiting hate speech is not always supported by those whom it aims to protect. Especially in the U.S., many hate speech victims have voiced that they would rather be exposed to the inconveniences of "too much" freedom (i.e. total freedom of speech and the possibility of verbal assault that it implies) than to the inconveniences of too much security (i.e. hate speech legislation).

A central aspect of the hate speech debate is that concepts of what is acceptable and unacceptable differ, depending on eras in history and one's cultural and religious background. For example, personalised criticism of homosexuality (e.g., expressing the belief that homosexuality is "immoral" because it conflicts with a person's religious beliefs) is, to some, a valid expression of one's values; to others, however, it is an expression of homophobia and is therefore homophobic hate speech. Prohibition in such cases is seen by some as an interference in their rights to express their beliefs. To others, these expressions generate harmful attitudes that potentially cause discrimination.

Furthermore, words which once "embodied" negative hate speech connotations, such as 'queer' or 'faggot' against homosexuals, 'nigger' against people of African origin and 'bitch' against women, have themselves been "reclaimed" by their respective groups or communities, who attached more positive meanings to the words, so undermining their value to those who wish to use them in a negative sense. Significations differ following the context, as Judith Butler argues.

Concepts of what qualifies as hate speech broadened in the late twentieth century to include certain views expressed from an ideological standpoint. For instance, some feminists consider jokes about women or lesbians to be hate speech. Recently, the Canadian government added sexual orientation to the list of relevant characteristics eligible for protection from hate speech. Not everyone accepts that there is a difference between classic forms of hate speech, which were incitements to hatred or even to physical harm, and the use of language that merely shows disrespect. Some discussions between politically right wing and left wing can be viewed as hateful, even though the language used by both sides is not normally classified as hate speech. However, some argue that such comments demean and undermine the individuals and so should qualify as hate speech.

Attitudes towards controlling hate speech cannot be reliably correlated with the traditional political spectrum. In the United States, there is a general consensus that free speech values take precedence over limiting the harm caused by verbal insult. At the same time, some conservatives believe verbally expressed "discrimination" against religions such as blasphemy, or sometimes "morally incorrect" or "unpatriotic" speech which opposes deep-seated sociocultural or religious mores, and national interest, should be condemned or prohibited, while liberals feel the same way about verbal "discrimination" against identity-related personal characteristics, such as homosexuality and language of someone who happens not to speak English (in the US and Canada when it comes to bilingualism).

1. Butler, Judith (1997). Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative. New York: Routledge. ISBN 0-415-91588-0.
2. ^ Slavoj Zizek, The Metastases of Enjoyment: On Women and Causality, Verso, London, NY, 1994, p.71

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hate_speech