Each� member of�
the� small group should� briefly indicate what they found most
striking in the reading; the group as a whole should ultimately formulate a
question for full seminar.� Since each
group will be made up of members from both seminars, the number of
questions will be larger than in the past.
Q1� How did Kandel and others expand his initial work on the �three simplest forms� of memory and learning in Aplysia to issues of implicit and explicit memory in mammals (ch. 20� passim).� How did this work provide a biological basis for Hebbian ideas about strengthening association and philosophical positions taken by Aristotle and British empiricist philosophers?� (p. 284)
Q2 In his discussion of the
history of research concerning sensory modalities, Kandel says the results are
�shades of Immanuel Kant� and quotes Mountcastle�s conclusion that �sensation
is an abstraction, not a replication of the real world.� (p. 304) A few pages
later he describes O�Keefe�s work on spatial knowledge as applying �Kantian
logic.� (p. 307)� What do you think
Kandel� means when he invokes the
philosopher Kant in this context?� How
would you briefly summarize the material he presents in chapters 22 and 23 around
this allusion to Kant?
Q3� How does Kandel connect fear and mental illness?� How does he relate memory (and his work on Aplysia) to fear?� (p337ff)� How does he extend his discussion to schizophrenia? (ch. 26 passim) Do you think that he has made a convincing case for a �reductionist� stategy in researching mental illness?
Q4� Throughout the book, and especially in chapter 27, Kandel points
to ways in which biology can be brought to bear on psychoanalytic ideas (p.
375, 388).� What remains for the psychoanalytic
approach to psychiatry if we embrace a �radical reductionism� in brain
science?� Are you convinced?�
�
Q5 Kandel briefly compares
Edelman�s approach to consciousness with Crick and Koch�s approach (p. 383).
What are the two approaches? Which seems more attractive to you, given Kandel�s
discussion of consciousness and your current beliefs about the nature of
consciousness?
Q6 How does Kandel
characterize the �new science of mind� that he discusses at various points in
the last half of the text? (pp. 304, 336, 376, 423ff, subtitle of book). Has he
made a convincing case that this is a new science of the Mind rather
than a broader, more sophisticated science of the Brain? That is, does
he point to a way of addressing� what
David Chalmers called �the hard problem of consciousness?� (p. 381).
Q7. Historians and
philosophers of science have embraced several general schemas to describe and
explain scientific change. How, if at all, does Kandel�s history of
neuroscience illustrate these views?�
What about the larger domain of a �science of mind� that initially
included Freudian psychology and behaviorist and later cognitive
psychology?�
(1)
Some
have described a slow, progressive growth of knowledge in a scientific domain.
Various forms of positivism took this approach, starting with August Comte in
19th century and the so-called logical positivists in the 20th
century.� This view typically emphasized
that the growth was gradual accumulation of �facts,� established by crucial
experiments, which gradually justified or confirmed scientific theories.�
(2)
Another
position, associated with Thomas Kuhn, presented a more �punctuated
equilibrium� account of scientific growth with periods of stasis (normal
science) alternating with periods of rapid change.� This approach questioned the notion of gradual progressive or
positive accumulation of scientific knowledge in favor of seeing transformation
of scientific points a view as a �gestalt shift� only loosely connected to an
evidential basis at the time of transformation.
(3)
A
third position, associated with Karl Popper, emphasized the importance of
falsification (rather than confirmation) in science and promoted a vision of
scientific change featuring bold conjectures, vigorous efforts to falsify these
conjectures, and provisional theories that survived these efforts.�