Week 6 Tuesday Study Questions on Churchland (p. 1-199)

 

Each  member of  the  small groups should  briefly indicate what they found most striking in the reading; the group as a whole should ultimately formulate a question for full seminar.

 

Q1. Patricia Churchland  illustrates the concept of reduction by discussing how  temperature was reduced to  mean molecular kinetic energy”(p 21.)  Discuss how she sees this reduction functioning in the history of science as it attempted to explain thermal phenomena.  In what ways does this case illustrate,  the picture of reduction captured in figure 1.10.  How does she contrast her view of reduction of mind to brain with that of  functionalists in the philosophy of mind (p. 25ff)? Do you find her initial embrace of reduction in this domain plausible?  If not, what problems do you see?  Has see addressed them in her discussion of “general worries” (p. 28-29)

 

Q2. What is Churchland’s view of  metaphysics and its relationship to science? How does it relate to the positions she attributes to Charles Sanders Peirce and W.V. Quine?  How does she contrast her position with that she dubs “beyond science metaphysics.” (p 41) What do you make of her argument that beyond science metaphysics faces “tough questions” from evolutionary theory?

 

Q3. Churchland challenges “substance dualism” from the perspective of neuroscience. (44 ff).  Assess how she uses split-brain phenomena and Alzheimer’s disease to advance this criticism.

 

Q4. Discuss Churchland’s presentation of  issues in the metaphysics of causation.  What is her semi-Kantian strategy? (p. 57). Do you think that it suggests a viable way of handling a traditional “beyond-science” metaphysical issues in an (evolutionary) scientific way

 

Q5  Churchland introduces David Hume’s approach to the self and the “conundrum” it faces (pp. 59-61)?
 How does her discussion of “Grush emulators” as representing self as agent (p 77ff),  somatosensory systems     (p. 91ff), as representing our bodily self,  mirror neurons (101) as representing ourselves among others, and metarepresentation (p. 107) provide a “scientific approach”  to the  philosophical (beyond science) to mind?

 

Q6. Churchland criticizes Descartes notion that we have direct knowledge of our own mind and that this makes knowledge of our mind different from knowledge of the physical world.(p. 118ff). She again appeal to elements of neuroscience in order to undermine the notion that we he have noninferential and infallible knowledge of our own mind. In doing so, uses science to undermine dualism (p. 123).  Do you believe that she has been successful in making her case.  If so, why?  If not, why not? 

 

Q7.  Churchland proposes an approach to human consciousness that begins with “prototypes,” not for definition in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions p. 129ff.  What contrast does she invoke? Do you find her examples, (e.g. old fire and new fire, gravity/levity in terms of natural place as opposed to a Newtonian conception) persuasive?  Do you think her approach would work for consciousness?

 

Q8.  Churchland proposes two strategies for approaching consciousness scientifically: the direct vs the indirect. How does she see binocular rivalry contributing to the direct approach to sensory awareness and ultimately to consciousness?  What problems or limitation does she see with the NCC (neural correlates of consciousness approach)?  How does the analogy of electromagnetic radiation fit into this discussion  ( p. 155)?

 

Q9.  Churchland examines views of Baars and Damasio as part of her exposition of the indirect approach to a scientific theory of consciousness.  What strengths and liabilities does she find in these views?

 

Q10.  Churchland concludes the chapter on consciousness with an examination of what she call “Nine Naysaying Arguments. (p. 173 ff).  She concentrates on the “inverted spectrum” argument.   What is it?  What is her criticism? How does it illustrate the “scientific” as opposed to the “beyond science” approach to metaphysics and the philosophy of consciousness?