Each member of
the small groups should briefly indicate what they found most striking in the
reading; the group as a whole should ultimately formulate a question for full
seminar.
(Note: some students may have the hardback version of the text. Two set of pages will be given in the questions: the first in bold is for the paperback, the second for the hardback).
Q1. Searle says (p. 97, p.
139 ) “Not all consciousness is intentional, and not all intentionality is
conscious” and gives two examples:
anxiety and a belief while we are asleep. What does Searle see as the
difference between consciousness
and intentionality? What does he mean when he says that
“intentional states always have aspectual shapes” (p. 117, p.167)? How does this apply to the example he
mentions about the difference between
representing something as the morning star and representing it as the evening
star (Note that we now know, but didn’t always, that the two in fact represent
the same object, namely, the planet Venus).
*Q2. Searle distinguishes
two views about how intentional states have the content they do: externalism
and internalism (p. 125, p. 178). He examines and rejects two arguments
for externalism: the “twin earth argument” and the “arthritis argument.” What
is the difference between externalism and internalism? What is the upshot of
each argument for externalism? Do you find Searle’s objections plausible? How does his “indexical” version of internalism
address these cases (p. 129f, p.185f). Does it show how meaning is in
the head (i.e. in the mind/brain)? In
particular, what does he mean when he says that “intentional content” (meaning) is determined by a combination of
life experiences and innate biological capacities (p. 131, p. 188). Does the thirst example (p. 115, p. 164 ) and its extension (p.
131, p. 188) provide an adequate illustration about how these intentional
states can have meaning?
Q3. Searle examines Hume’s account of causation in chapter 7. What is Hume’s account of causation and what are Searle’s objections to it? What is his alternative when we “abandon the traditional Cartesian categories of the mental and the physical” (p. 147, p. 210 ). Discuss this in terms of the diagrams on (p. 148, p. 210)
Q4 Discuss Searle’s claim that the Cartesian account of mind does not
allow for an unconscious (p. 166, p. 238). Do you think that all dualists, including religious dualists who
speak of a soul, must reject an unconscious?
Q5. Searle distinguishes four
“types” of unconscious mental states (p. 167f, p. 240). What are they? Why does he reject the notion of a “deep unconscious?”
Q6. Searle examines issues about perception by
presenting the position he calls “direct realism” or “naïve realism” (a
position he ultimately embraces) (p. 180, p. 260). What is it and do you
find it initially plausible? He then
presents a number of standard arguments against it. Consider some of them, and his refutations.
Q7. Searle concludes chapter 10
with his own argument for direct realism and against the representational
theory of mind. Does he succeed? In last Friday afternoon’s discussion, significant
number of people in our class embraced the representational theory and held
that we don’t directly perceive objects in the external world, but instead
perceive only our internal representations of them. Do you hold this view? If so why? How do you avoid the objections
that Searle presents?
Q8. Searle concludes the book
with a very brief chapter that portrays the book as situating “mental phenomena as part of the natural
world” (p. 207, p. 301). Has he succeeded in the sections we have
read—that is, has he successfully countered Cartesian dualism?
*This is a difficult
question. If you get bogged down, move on to the next question.